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Abstract  
 
The article aims to investigate the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes 
towards government responsibility for citizens’ welfare. The rationale for such a 
relationship stems from the idea that religion and government spending can be intended as 
substitute mechanisms that may insure individuals against negative life events. We 
theorized the existence of an additional and opposite mechanism working in certain 
contexts: complementarity of responsibility. The local solutions provided by Church 
organizations and state interventions are not always perceived to be in opposition, but they 
can reinforce each other. In testing the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward 
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public support, we hypothesized a moderating impact of contextual features: the prevalent 
religious denomination in a country and the type of welfare state regime. Both may have 
indeed influence on citizens’ opinions about the role of government responsibility because 
they contribute to shape individual preferences. To address these issues in a multilevel 
framework, we analyze the integrated European Value Study database for 31 European 
countries. Our results confirm that the different Christian doctrines, the various types of 
welfare state regimes, as well as the combinations of the two, shape differently the 
relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward government responsibility. 
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Introduction 
 
Religious institutions and state welfare systems are often intended as to perform the same 
functions in supporting the poor and deprived. A branch of literature maintains that religion 
can work as a coping strategy for individuals facing difficult life events by providing 
psychological as well as material support in the form of community assistance. Welfare 
state systems clearly do the same and this has led some scholars to interpret religion and 
the welfare state as substitutes. If this substitution effect is actually working, individuals 
who insure themselves through religion should be less favorable to high levels of social 
insurance by the state. For Christian Europe, this relationship is likely to be influenced ‒ 
strengthened or weakened ‒ by the national context. Regarding the latter, we argue that two 
major features can shape the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes 
toward government intervention for citizens’ welfare. On the one hand, the prevailing 
religious denomination in a country (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox) can give completely 
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different meaning to reliance on forms of support other than the Church. On the other hand, 
the different types of welfare regime, which are based on very different models of 
solidarity, can also drive popular support for state intervention.  
The analysis presented here deals with relationships among quite complex concepts 
(religiosity, Churches, welfare state), that an empirical operationalization based on 
secondary data cannot fully grasp. Accordingly, our considerations cannot be extended 
beyond the specific conceptual stance adopted here. Bearing this limitation in mind, we 
will test how the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward 
government responsibility for citizens’ welfare is moderated by these different features of 
the national context. We will first consider the distinction among the different Christian 
doctrines, moving afterwards to the different welfare regimes and then to a combination of 
the two. We will do so by applying a multilevel model to the last three waves of EVS data 
after excluding the non-Christian European countries. We expect that both macro-level 
characteristics play a role in shaping the relationship between individual religiosity and 
attitudes toward government responsibility. Moreover, we argue that the differences 
between religious and non-religious are not necessarily generated by the substitution effect 
mechanism. Under specific configurations of welfare regime and religious denomination ‒ 
where both state and church are viewed as responsible for providing for citizens ‒ a 
complementarity mechanism might be at work. We will start by presenting the theoretical 
framework underlying our analysis and then move to the hypotheses. After introducing the 
data and the method we use, we will present the results and discuss them. 
 
 
1. Theoretical Framework 
 
The religious-secular cleavage in attitudes to welfare spending is under-investigated in 
political sociology. This is not surprising, given the dominant view that in modern and 
secularized Western societies religion plays only a minor role in shaping people’s everyday 
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lives and opinions (Stegmueller et al. 2012). Thus, the relationship between individual 
religiosity and attitudes toward government responsibility for citizens’ welfare has received 
little attention in the literature1. The reason for investigating this relationship stems mainly 
from the idea that religion and government spending can be considered as substitutes that 
insure individuals against adverse life events (Scheve and Stasavage 2006). Individuals 
who rely on religion to deal with their difficulties would not need the government’s welfare 
provision and thus would be less inclined to support it. Consequently, religious individuals 
on average should prefer lower levels of social insurance provision than secular individuals. 
Seeing religion and public intervention as substitutes derives from the consideration that 
religion can work as a coping strategy for individuals facing difficult life events. As 
Immerzeel and Van Tubergen (2011) state, «religious ideologies provide people with 
predictable rules to help them cope with dangers and immediate problems». These positive 
effects of religion have been demonstrated by many studies. Religious individuals tend to 
have higher life satisfaction and subjective well-being (Ellison et al. 1989; Ellison 1991), 
lower incidence of depression (Park et al. 1990) and suffer from significantly lower losses 
in self-esteem after episodes like unemployment (Clark and Lelkes 2004). Moreover, being 
integrated into a religious group or community helps individuals to cope with adverse life 
events by providing them with both material and psychological support (Pargament 1997; 
2002; Clark and Lelkes 2004; Scheve and Stasavage 2006; Brandt and Henry 2012). This 
role of religion in providing economic as well as psychological benefits to individuals 
facing situations of insecurity overlaps significantly with the same functions offered by 
welfare state programs. If one accepts that religion and welfare state programs have similar 
effects, and that both have costs, then individuals who insure themselves via religion 
«should logically prefer a lower level of insurance by the state» (Scheve and Stasavage 
2006, 263)2. 
                                                             
1
 We use attitudes toward government responsibility, attitudes toward public support, and attitudes 
toward state intervention as synonyms. 
2
 This relationship between welfare state arrangements and (religious-based) informal solidarity can 
also be found in the literature under the name of crowding out hypothesis. The idea is that the welfare 
state tends to undermine less formalized solidarity practices where religious communities are 
5 
 
Churches historically provided some kind of social welfare prior to the evolution of the 
modern welfare state (Brodman 2009). As governments started to assume these welfare 
functions, individuals with elastic preferences started to think about the costs of their 
religious participation, as the desired welfare goods could also be obtained  from secular 
sources (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004). This literature therefore suggests ‒ as we mentioned 
earlier ‒ a negative (substitution) effect: religious individuals are no longer likely to 
demand other kinds of social insurance because congregation members still receive 
benefits directly from religion (Scheve and Stasavage 2006, 262). This negative 
relationship has been shown in all the (few) investigations concerning European countries. 
Scheve and Stasavage (2006) found a negative cross-country relationship between 
religiosity and level of social spending and the same relationship is also present within 
countries: individuals who describe themselves as religious prefer lower levels of 
government spending than secular individuals. The same negative relationship is found by 
Stegmueller and colleagues (2012) when concluding that both Catholics and Protestants 
strongly oppose redistribution. As a matter of fact, none of these studies consider Orthodox 
countries. Ervasti (2009) and colleagues also investigated whether there is a religious factor 
involved in support for the welfare state in Europe. They found that religiosity has a clear 
effect on welfare state attitudes at the individual level. They consider the interaction with 
the general level of religiosity, which shows a very limited effect, and not the interaction 
with religious denomination (Ervasti et al. 2009). 
The Catholic-Protestant cleavage investigated by Stegmueller and colleagues (2012) is 
seldom used to investigate European differences regarding attitudes toward the role of the 
state and its social policies. The sociological root of this thought is clearly inspired by the 
classic Weberian work on Protestantism. According to Weber (Weber 1930), when 
religious doctrine suggests that economic success is only a matter of individual merit, 
individuals may prefer lower levels of social insurance. On the Catholic side, by contrast, 
                                                             
considered as one particular form of social capital. However, there is no consensus that the welfare 
state crowds out other forms of private support (van Oorschot et al. 2005; Böhnke 2008). 
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it has often been emphasized that there is a strong link between the welfare policies adopted 
by the Christian Democratic parties and the Catholic tradition: such Catholic policies differ 
systematically from those pursued by Social Democratic parties (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
At first glance, this overlap between the Catholic tradition and Christian Democratic party 
policies can suggest a positive attitude toward state intervention or at least that Catholics 
may be less opposed to state intervention than Protestants (van Oorschot 2000; Kahl 2005). 
The facts, however, speak otherwise. The Catholic Church has always been averse to state 
intervention, preferring local solutions provided by Church organizations and based on the 
principle of subsidiarity. As a matter of fact, poor relief officials have always been mainly 
representatives of the clergy. On the contrary, Protestant church and state mutually 
reinforced themselves during the Reformation (Kahl 2005), but this positive relation 
disappeared when the modern state arose. In that period, the state took the upper hand in 
conflicts about moral authority and material resources (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), and 
churches became only one organization among many. 
This Catholic-Protestant cleavage has been found in some studies (Manow 2002; Kahl 
2005) which pinpoint the differences between the two religious traditions in the timing and 
generosity of welfare policies (Stegmueller et al. 2012). However, it is possible that the 
processes of secularization Europe is experiencing can make this difference less salient, so 
that the most important cleavage in modern times is between secular and religious 
individuals rather than between Catholics and Protestants (Inglehart 1997; Olson and Green 
2006; Stegmueller et al. 2012). 
While focusing on the denominational differences between Catholicism and Protestantism, 
this debate seemed to have forgotten the third largest European confession: Orthodoxy. 
Given the absence of empirical studies, we can only offer an educated guess about the 
possible relation. This guess must be clearly based on the Communist past of most 
Orthodox-majority European countries. During the regime, religion was persecuted (Froese 
2004; Tomka 2010) and the regime itself imposed a «politically forced secularization» 
(Meulemann 2004; Müller and Neundord 2012), leaving religion as the only source of 
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opposition (Tomka 2010). In the aftermath of the Communist dominion, the most obvious 
reaction was to bring religion back into the public debate. Most politicians and political 
forces started – and continue – to use Orthodoxy as a way to reconstruct a post-Communist 
identity and to legitimize their political power (Borowik 2002; Meulemann 2004). This 
clearly led to a strong interconnection between political government forces and Orthodox 
religion, though whether this corresponds to a positive attitude toward state intervention 
has yet to be demonstrated. 
The discussion of religions’ role in supporting or hindering (attitudes toward) government 
responsibilities should not be disjoint from the theorization put forward in the field of 
welfare state studies about the importance of welfare institutions for the legitimacy of social 
policies. Just as religions play a role in legitimizing (or not legitimizing) social policies, 
thus generating popular support among believers, so do welfare institutions. The concept 
underlying this idea is that of policy (or institutional) feedback. This concept captures a – 
possibly unintended – effect of welfare institutions which not only set constraints and 
opportunities for social actors, but can also contribute to shaping their preferences. This in 
turn generates and reproduces institutions’ own legitimacy, influencing citizens’ 
perceptions and opinions (Pierson 1993; Rothstein 1998; Mettler and Soss 2004). The same 
idea was expressed by Esping-Andersen (1990) when explaining differences among his 
three ideal-typical welfare regimes. He maintained that the goal of welfare states is to 
promote equality and establish institutionalized solidarity among citizens. In the long run, 
citizens’ preferences will become aligned with the goals of the welfare state3. 
However, different welfare regimes have subscribed to different models of solidarity, i.e., 
they built their institutions and social policies around different principles of justice 
(Gelissen 2000; Arts and Gelissen 2001). The social-democratic welfare regimes 
emphasize universalistic solidarity and egalitarianism (equality of outcome) and through 
                                                             
3
 The genesis and development of welfare state institutions is strongly intertwined with the history 
of religious institutions and their relationships with the state in different nations. For analytical 
reasons, here we treat the influence of welfare state institutions and religious denominations 
separately, although we are fully aware that they are not completely independent factors. 
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large state interventions (from cradle to grave) aim for high de-commodification, i.e., 
independence of citizens from the market to meet their basic needs. By contrast, the liberal 
welfare regimes are based on the principles of equity and equality of opportunities (rather 
than outcomes), whereby citizens are themselves responsible for their own welfare and the 
market is considered to reward everyone according to their achievements and merits. 
Accordingly, the state maintains a residual role in granting only minimal support to the 
deserving poor. Midway between the liberal and the social-democratic regimes, there are 
corporatist (or conservative) regimes that emphasize solidarity within class, status, and 
family groups. As society’s stratification is considered to be functional, the welfare state 
aims at preserving class and status differentiations. The degree of de-commodification 
strongly depends on an individual’s position in the labor market (unemployment benefits 
and other kinds of social transfers are linked to occupations) and within the family 
(prominence of the male breadwinner model). Lastly, in the Mediterranean welfare regimes 
(Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997), the type of solidarity promoted by the state relies heavily on 
family bonds, and the welfare institutions working in this regime resemble those of the 
corporatist regimes, although they are underdeveloped and immature by comparison. 
The former socialist countries currently elude a firmly established classification of their 
welfare institutions, which are now absent or largely underdeveloped. After the collapse of 
the communist regimes, these countries transitioned toward the market economy without 
replacing the kind of social provisions formerly ensured by the state. Scholars in the field 
of social policy have not reached a consensus on what directions former socialist countries’ 
welfare policies are taking. In particular, it is still not clear whether these countries are 
moving toward one of Esping-Andersen’s ideal-types or are developing distinct welfare 
regimes, which also depend on the influence that supranational institutions like the 
European Union, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank exert on former 
socialist countries’ governments (Deacon 2000). Fenger’s (2007) empirical analysis 
provides grounds for clustering former socialist countries in one group which is clearly 
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distinct from the other well-established welfare regime types – even if it shows substantial 
heterogeneity. 
A hypothesis arising from the strand of sociological perspectives on the welfare state we 
have just outlined is that support for government intervention should vary systematically 
across welfare regimes, being higher in countries where the welfare state is more 
developed. Although this hypothesis has been subjected to extensive testing in comparative 
research (Svallfors 1997; Gelissen 2000; Andress and Heien 2001; Arts and Gelissen 2001; 
Linos and West 2003; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Jaeger 2006; 2009; Jordan 2013; 
Roosma et al. 2013; Calzada et al. 2014), the evidence was generally unsupportive. 
However, the regime hypothesis was not categorically rejected because much actually 
depends on how the dependent and independent variable (the regimes) are measured 
(Jaeger 2006; 2009). 
That said, in social-democratic welfare regimes, the prevailing universalistic model of 
social solidarity assigns a paramount role to the state. Consequently, any non-governmental 
form of solidarity (like that stemming from religious institutions and communities) is likely 
to complement rather than substitute government intervention. Therefore, the religious 
cleavage should not be important in shaping attitudes toward government intervention in 
these countries. In liberal welfare regimes, as the role of the state is minimal, the role of 
religion in providing solidarity should naturally increase and qualify as a substitute for 
government intervention. However, given the modest role of government intervention, the 
trade-off for citizens between public insurance and insurance via religion could be 
relatively low. By contrast, in corporatist welfare regimes the benefits that can be accessed 
through government intervention are more substantial (so the stake is higher), but they are 
not framed in a model of universalistic solidarity as in the social-democratic regimes. 
Therefore, religion is more likely to qualify as a valid alternative to welfare state provision. 
In Mediterranean regimes, which have features similar to the corporatist regime, similar 
reasoning can apply. In former socialist countries, given their primitive or absent forms of 
welfare institutions, the role of religion could be similar to the one it has in liberal regimes, 
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i.e., a substitute for government intervention. However, these countries are characterized 
by the peculiar relationship between Church and State resulting from the historical 
vicissitudes of the Communist period. Nowadays the Church is perceived as the 
stakeholder of national integrity and the opponent of the former socialist system, and 
individual religiousness seems to be interwoven with national identity (Helander and 
Riegel 2009). For these reasons, we can expect a positive relationship between religiosity 
and attitudes toward government intervention. 
 
 
2. Research question and hypotheses 
 
To the best of our knowledge, no study has considered whether and to what extent 
individual religiosity affects attitudes toward government responsibility for citizens’ 
welfare while taking religious denomination and type of welfare regime into account as 
moderator variables. In this connection, we argue that religiosity can have a positive, null 
or negative effect on individual attitudes depending on both the countries’ predominant 
Christian denomination and the solidarity model underlying their welfare regimes. In 
testing this, we will look at both macro-features first separately and then jointly. 
Regarding the first macro-level factor, prevalent religious denomination, we can expect 
that the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward public support is negative ‒ 
due to the substitution mechanism ‒ only in Catholic countries, where religious individuals 
should be less favorable to government intervention than non-religious individuals. In 
Protestant countries, the centrality of individual merit does not encourage either the 
principle of subsidiarity or state intervention. In this case, we can expect that individual 
religiosity does not affect attitudes toward government intervention. In Orthodox areas, by 
contrast, the strong interconnection between political government forces and religious 
authorities can result in a positive relationship between the two variables, and we would 
11 
 
expect to find that religious individuals ask for higher levels of government provision than 
secular individuals. 
Regarding the welfare regime, we draw attention to the role of the state in protecting and 
promoting socio-economic well-being. We can expect that in countries where welfare 
generosity is particularly high or – vice versa – very low, the effect of individual religious 
practice on attitudes toward public support is small or null, as it is the solidarity model 
behind the welfare regime that is mainly relevant. Therefore, we can expect that individual 
religiosity should not affect citizens’ attitudes toward public support in Social Democratic 
countries – where a strong egalitarian solidarity model is present – and in Liberal nations 
characterized by a residual conception of state intervention. In both Mediterranean and 
Corporatist contexts, we can expect that religiosity has a negative influence on attitudes 
toward government intervention, given that it reinforces the idea of a channel of solidarity 
other than the state. Finally, in the former socialist countries we can expect a positive effect 
of religiosity on attitudes toward government responsibility. In these contexts, the mutual 
support between religion and state in «burning the bridges» (Mitrokhin 1994) with the past 
can be so strong as to create a complementarity effect: both church and the government 
should ensure that everyone is provided for. If true, religious individuals are likely to appeal 
to the state for more intervention. 
Although we presented them analytically as disjointed, the boundaries between these two 
macro-features are blurred and they can also combine in mediating the impact of individual 
religiosity on attitudes toward government responsibility. The resultant effect is therefore 
a matter of which effect prevails over the other. The expected effects of such combinations 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
Table 1 Here 
Table 1. Expected relationship between individual religiosity and attitude towards 
government intervention by country’s prevalent religious denomination and welfare 
regime. 
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What we expect here is that the substitution effect between individual religiosity and 
attitudes toward state intervention can be reinforced or suppressed according to inherent 
features of the surrounding context. These features regard both the prevalent Christian 
denomination and the welfare regime, but the effects of the two can combine. Given the 
absence of a dominant religious culture, we hypothesize that the mixed countries relation 
is mainly driven by the related welfare regime. 
 
 
3. Data and method 
 
This study is based on the European Values Study longitudinal data file (ZA4804 version 
3.0.0), a collection of four harmonized repeated cross-sectional surveys conducted in 
several European countries at approximately nine-year intervals (from 1981 to 2008). 
Given that the question used here as the dependent variable is available for three waves 
only (1990, 1999, 2008), we selected all the available data for those waves using the pooled 
approach (Firebaugh 1997). Although we are not interested in modeling variations across 
waves, having more data allows us to overcome robustness issues that inevitably arise when 
using only one wave. This strategy increases the proportion of individuals included in the 
analyses, whereas using only one wave of data could require an increase in the sample size 
for certain countries (Firebaugh 1997; Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2012). As for country 
selection, given our focus on Christian religious denominations, we discarded Muslim-
majority countries (Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus and Turkey). In all, we kept 
40 countries and 94 country-waves (as not all countries participated in all waves). 
Multinational and multi-wave datasets like the EVS have a complex hierarchical structure. 
One of the most widely used and easiest ways to model the structure of these data is one in 
which individuals are nested within country-waves which are nested in turn within 
countries (Fairbrother 2014). However, this structure is most appropriate when the focus is 
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on the effects of time-varying macro-level variables, which is not our case. As we found 
that the three-level model does not yield results differing from a two-level model 
(individuals nested within countries), we report results from the simpler estimation. 
Moreover, as our research question deals with the varying relationship between religiosity 
and attitudes toward public support across contexts, we specified multilevel models with 
random intercept and random slope for religiosity.The dependent variable of the analysis 
is a question asking interviewees to place their opinion on a 1-10 scale whose extremes are 
the following statements: «Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for 
themselves» (1), or «The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is 
provided for» (10). What is captured by this question is clearly respondents’ support for 
the general principle of state intervention for citizens’ welfare rather than their support for 
the current welfare policies. In other words, it probes the dimension referring to the goals 
of the welfare state4. For ease of interpretation of regression coefficients, we treat this 
variable as numerical. 
In operationalizing individual religiosity as the main micro-level independent variable, we 
created a dummy for attendance at religious services, setting the threshold of being 
religious to at least one service a month5. Scholars of the sociology of religion agree in 
defining individual religiosity as a strong multidimensional concept (Glock 1962). In 
particular, the dimensions of practice and belief are the most widely debated. This 
considered, the majority agrees that the focus on religious practice can be the most rigorous 
standard because it requires a commitment of time  (McAndrew and Voas 2011, 3), partly 
                                                             
4
 Attitudes toward the welfare state are likely multidimensional and do not stem from one underlying 
general pro- or anti-welfare attitude, as several studies show (see, e.g., Roosma et al. 2013, Van 
Oorschot and Meulemann 2011). Our focus on the goal dimension is largely due to data availability. 
Other important dimensions concern the range, the degree, the efficiency/effectiveness and the 
outcomes. Nonetheless, a focus on the goals of the welfare state seems appropriate as we investigate 
whether or not the welfare state and religion are perceived to be substitutes in pursuing the same 
goal. 
5 Given the denominational heterogeneity of our sample, we opted for the monthly attendance 
threshold instead of the weekly attendance threshold. This is because Sunday Mass participation is 
a precept only of Catholicism and thus using this threshold for either Protestants or Orthodox would 
not be appropriate. The shortcoming here is to be more inclusive than usual on the Catholic side. In 
any case, given the widespread diffusion of the weekly attendance variable, we produced the same 
analyses as a robustness check using this threshold. Results are consistent and available on request. 
14 
 
because it is particularly effective for measuring the ritualistic dimension of individual 
religiosity (Biolcati-Rinaldi and Vezzoni 2014, 2). As our research is based on a sample of 
different denominations, cross-national comparability should be the main drive in building 
this variable. Accordingly, attendance is more likely to be considered equivalent across 
different countries and cultures whereas religious beliefs are less (Brenner 2016, 566). This 
is because the comparison of behaviors is more justifiable given the equivalence of units 
of time and the conceptual equivalence between traditionally Christian societies (Brenner 
2016, 566). Also from the methodological point of view, the associated question (church 
attendance) is quite simple to formulate and easy to understand (Biolcati-Rinaldi and 
Vezzoni 2014), and it is present in every international survey (Brenner 2016, 566). In 
addition, other micro-level variables are used as controls for compositional effects across 
nations and waves. They are basic socio-demographic characteristics such as age (6 
categories), gender (dichotomous), years of formal education (four levels), employment 
status (employed, retired, out of labor force, unemployed)6, and marital status (dummy for 
married people). 
The two macro-level independent variables are the prevalent religious denomination and 
the welfare regime. We built the variable concerning the prevalent religious denomination 
by summarizing the individual information gathered with the question ‘Which religious 
denomination do you belong to?’. In cases where an unclear situation (high percentages – 
25% or more – for two different denominations) is present, we coded the countries as 
‘mixed’ (see Appendix). There are two different reasons for considering religious 
denomination as a macro, rather than micro, variable. On the one hand, we are interested 
in describing the religious context in which the relation between individual religiosity and 
attitude toward the welfare state takes place. On the other hand, results show the high 
denominational homogeneity within countries (with only a very few exceptions). Together, 
these two considerations effectively describe the setting of our research: a religious 
                                                             
6
 We avoided using information on occupation because it was not consistently collected across 
waves. 
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tradition which drives an individual relationship in which religious individuals are likely 
to belong to the country’s prevalent denomination. Regarding the welfare regime types, we 
followed the usual classifications and identified Liberal countries (Great Britain and 
Ireland), Corporatist countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, and Switzerland), Social-democratic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, and Sweden), Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain) and former socialist countries (Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Ukraine). 
 
4. Results 
Descriptive data on the main variables are summarized in Table 2. Individual religiosity, 
as represented by monthly attendance at religious services, presents a great deal of cross-
country and cross-context variation. At one pole, we find the lowest religious service 
attendance in Social-democratic Protestant countries. In addition, France, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Montenegro, and the Russian Federation also seem to be very secular with a 
percentage of churchgoers lower than 15%. At the other pole, the highest religious 
participation is found for Malta, Ireland, and Poland (over 70% of religious practitioners) 
and in general for all the Catholic-majority countries. Orthodox countries are placed 
somewhere in between Catholics and Protestants: religious practice is in fact moderately 
high, but high country variability is also present. 
Moving to attitudes toward government intervention, as represented by self-placement 
along a scale of individual versus state responsibility for citizens’ welfare, we see that the 
average opinion differs mainly according to the type of welfare regime. In fact, it should 
be noted that two groups of countries seem to emerge. On the one hand, we have 
Corporatist, Social-democratic and Liberal countries with lower support for state 
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intervention (always lower than 5). On the other hand, we have Mediterranean and former 
Socialist countries showing higher support (almost always higher than 5). 
Beyond the average differences among countries, we focus on whether there is a 
relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward state responsibility and how it changes 
depending on the context. At a descriptive level, looking at the last three columns of Table 
1, we can observe that attitudes toward state intervention can be quite different between 
religious and non-religious individuals. We found the wider – negative – gap in France, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain and Austria, where being religious means being less favorable 
towards government intervention. In general, this negative relation between religiosity and 
attitude toward redistribution seems to be present in all the Corporatist and Mediterranean 
Catholic countries except Belgium. Differences in the opposite direction are found instead 
in Estonia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland. In these former Socialist 
countries, individual religiosity is more often positively associated with attitudes toward 
state responsibility. 
Though these descriptive results are interesting, testing our hypotheses calls for 
multivariate analysis to model the variability of these bivariate relationships as a function 
of social contexts. 
 
Table 2 Here 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on attendance at religious services (%) and attitudes toward 
state responsibility (average score) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from EVS harmonized data (1990-2008). *: average score 
on a 1-10 scale where 1=individual responsibility, 10=state responsibility. 
 
We estimated four models of the effect of religious practice on attitudes toward government 
intervention. Table 3 shows the results of the four multilevel regressions. In the first model, 
we included only individual level covariates, allowing the intercept and the coefficient of 
religious practice to vary across countries. The coefficient in this model reports the average 
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effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward state intervention (1-10 scale, higher 
scores indicating increasing support for «The state should take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is provided for»), with significant differences between countries. A 
negative coefficient means that religious individuals are less in favor of government 
intervention, net of socio-demographic controls (gender, age, marital status, etc.) that 
account for compositional effects.7 From this model, we see that religious practice has no 
effect on average. However, the coefficient shows high variance (see random-effects 
parameters) which suggests that the effect might be very different among countries and 
contexts. 
Starting from this finding, our subsequent models included macro-level variables interacted 
with religious practice. Model 2 considers the religious denomination, model 3 considers 
the welfare regimes, and model 4 takes into account both denomination and welfare 
regimes together. The interaction effects between the micro and the macro level show how 
the macro-level factors affect the strength of the relationship between religiosity and 
attitudes toward state intervention, and also statistically explain the variance of the slope 
of religiosity. For ease of interpretation, the main results from these models have been 
reported graphically in Figures 1-3, which present the effects of individual religiosity 
according to the different country contexts. In model 2 (Figure 1), only the country’s 
religious denomination was included. From this model, we found that religious practice has 
a negative effect in Catholic countries ‒ meaning that religious individuals are less 
favorable to government intervention ‒ and a positive effect in Orthodox countries, whereas 
in Protestant and Mixed countries the effect is null. In model three (Figure 2), we included 
interactions between religious practice and welfare regime type (without religious 
denomination). We found significant negative effects of religious practice only in 
Corporatist and Mediterranean countries and a positive effect in former Socialist countries. 
Table 3 Here 
                                                             
7
 As our regression model aims to estimate the causal effect of individual religiosity, socio-
demographic variables are considered only as controls and thus their coefficients cannot have a 
causal interpretation (Pisati 2010). 
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Table 3. Multilevel models of the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government 
responsibility. 
 
To consider the combination of these two macro features, we estimated a fourth model with 
the interactions between religious practice and a combination of welfare regime and 
religious denomination (Figure 3). The pattern of these results is interesting because it 
reveals the interplay between welfare regime types and religious denominations in 
determining the effect of individual religious practice on attitudes. Social-democratic 
countries are only Protestant, so the effect of religious practice is the same we found in 
models 2 and 3 and is null. In Liberal countries, as they are both Catholic (Ireland) or Mixed 
(Great Britain), the effect is small and non-significant. For Ireland, the role of religious 
denomination is thus cancelled by the welfare regime context. In Corporatist countries, 
which are both Catholic or Mixed, religious practice has a negative effect. This means that 
the role of religion at macro-level is confirmed (Catholic countries) or overridden (in Mixed 
countries) by the type of welfare regime. Mediterranean countries are either Catholic or 
Orthodox. Among the former, religious practice has a negative effect; among the latter the 
effect is null, implying that the effects of religion and welfare regime cancel each other out. 
Former Socialist countries are perhaps the most interesting cases because they can be either 
Catholic, Mixed (Protestant-Catholic-Orthodox) or Orthodox. The effect of religious 
practice is small and non-significant in Catholic countries, strongly positive in Mixed 
countries and positive in the Orthodox ones. Therefore, it can be said that the role of the 
Catholic religion overrides the socialist heritage of these countries, whereas the Orthodox 
religion (which also is present in Mixed countries) reinforces it. 
Finally, it should be noted that the variance of the coefficient of religious practice is 
strongly reduced (about halved) with the introduction of interactions with welfare regimes 
(model 3) or combinations of welfare regime and religious denomination (model 4). This 
finding can be interpreted as indicating that what mainly affects the relationship of interest 
is the welfare regime context, although relevant exceptions should not be disregarded. 
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Figures 1-3 Here 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
In this article, we investigated the relationship between individual religiosity, as captured 
by church attendance, and attitudes toward government responsibility for citizens’ welfare. 
The main body of literature suggested a substitution mechanism between religion and state 
such that religious individuals should prefer lower levels of state intervention. However, 
we theorized the existence of an additional and opposite mechanism working in certain 
contexts: complementarity of responsibility. The local solution provided by Church 
organizations and state interventions are not always perceived to be in opposition, but they 
can reinforce each other. In testing the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward 
public support, we hypothesized a moderating impact of contextual features. In particular, 
we considered two macro features such as the prevalent Christian denomination and the 
type of welfare regime within each Christian European country. In this connection this, we 
hypothesized that the supposed – negative – substitution effect is present only for 
Catholicism, whereas the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward government 
responsibility does not exist in Protestant countries or is positive in Orthodox countries. At 
the same time, we also hypothesized that such a relationship does not exist in social-
democratic and liberal countries, is negative in Mediterranean and corporatist countries, 
and is positive in former socialist countries. The actual individual relationship can be thus 
negative, positive or null according to the joint moderating effect of welfare regime and 
religious denomination. We tested this explicitly using a combination of both, finding a 
negative relationship for the conservative Catholic and mixed countries and for the 
Mediterranean Catholic ones. On the other hand, we hypothesized a positive relationship 
for the former socialist Orthodox and mixed countries. The effect for all the other 
combinations was expected to be null and our findings were consistent. 
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As concerns denominational differences, Stegmueller and colleagues (2012) concluded that 
both Protestants and Catholics show about the same level of support for the principle of 
governmental income redistribution (i.e., the means of financing the welfare state). Starting 
from this, they maintained that the denominational cleavage between Catholics and 
Protestants is losing ground in favor of a more classical religious-secular cleavage and that 
the effect of this cleavage is comparable to the effect of income or education. Therefore, 
they argued that, although religious organizations may have lost their power in shaping 
policy making, religion continues to influence individual’s attitudes «which are not 
restricted to questions of ‘private morale’» (Stegmueller et al. 2012, 19). 
Our results only partially confirm this. 
First, the effects of individual religiosity that we found are not comparable in size to the 
differences by income or education (Table 3). When shaping individual preferences toward 
government responsibility, these two latter remain the stronger predictors. Even if we 
consider the effect of religiosity, the analysis of the macro context shows results that differ 
in part from those of Stegmueller and colleagues. In fact, our results show that the 
Protestant denomination, the social-democratic and the liberal welfare regimes cancel out 
the individual relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward state responsibility. In 
such countries, which are basically the Northern countries plus Ireland and the UK, the 
relationship does not exist. In countries where Catholicism (or a strong Catholic 
component) combines with corporatist (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France and 
Benelux) or Mediterranean (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Malta) welfare regimes, we found the 
substitution effect theorized by Stegmueller et al. (2012). 
Conversely, an opposite effect emerged in countries where the socialist past (and the 
resulting welfare regime) combines with Orthodoxy. In such countries (Armenia, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Serbia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia), religious individuals are more likely to support the 
principle of state intervention for citizens’ welfare. In between these two latter groups, 
there are two clusters of countries for which the effects of religious denomination and 
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welfare regime basically cancel each other out. This is the case of Mediterranean Orthodox 
countries (Greece, Cyprus) and former-socialist Catholic countries (Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia). 
The relationships investigated in this article regard complex phenomena such as religion 
and welfare state. Their empirical operationalization requires simplifications that inevitably 
reduce the theoretical scope of the underlying concepts, particularly when the analysis is 
carried out within the boundaries of secondary data. Our findings therefore represent only 
a small portion of a big picture that could be viewed from other points of view. That said, 
what clearly emerges from our analysis is that the religious influence in shaping individual 
attitudes toward government responsibility is definitely not a matter of Protestantism and 
the social-democratic or liberal tradition. Catholicism seems to drive the substitution effect 
between religion and state, and this effect is reinforced in corporatist and Mediterranean 
countries. The communist past of the Eastern European countries seems to show a kind of 
overlap between religion and state authority, and this results in a positive relationship 
between religiosity and the principle of state intervention. This is reinforced by the 
Orthodox tradition, but nullified where Catholicism is the dominant religious tradition. 
 Considering these results, a few thoughts about the near future of the relation 
between religiosity and state intervention are in order. As many studies show, European 
religiosity is constantly declining (Brenner 2016) with only a few possible exceptions in 
some former communist countries (Greeley 2002; Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012; Tomka 
2010). If this scenario is confirmed, the secularization processes Europe is experiencing 
will probably cancel out the substitution effect we found for Catholic countries (as that for 
Protestants is already null). The most interesting (and unexpected) development concerns 
instead the former communist Orthodox countries. Given the positive relation between 
religiosity and state intervention we found, if these countries are in fact an exception to the 
secularization pattern, the relation is likely to strengthen. 
 
Appendix 
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Table A1. Religious denomination by country. 
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Table 1. Expected relationship between individual religiosity and attitude towards government 
intervention by country’s prevalent religious denomination and welfare regime. 
Welfare regime and religious 
denomination clusters 
Expected 
relationship 
according to 
religious 
denomination 
Expected 
relationship 
according to 
welfare 
regime  
Relevant 
factors 
Expected 
relationship 
according to 
both factors 
Social democratic - Protestant Null Null Both Null 
Liberal - Catholic Negative  Null Both  
Null/Negativ
e  
Liberal – Mixed religion  Null Only welfare  Null 
Corporatist - Catholic Negative Negative Both Negative 
Corporatist - Mixed religion  Negative Only welfare  Negative 
Mediterranean - Catholic Negative Negative Both Negative 
Mediterranean - Orthodox Positive Negative Both Null 
Former socialist - Catholic Negative Positive Both Null 
Former socialist - Mixed religion  Positive Only welfare  Positive 
Former socialist - Orthodox Positive Positive Both Positive 
  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on attendance at religious services (%) and attitudes toward state 
responsibility (average score) 
Welfare regime and 
prevalent religious 
denomination 
Country Monthly 
attendance (%) 
Attitudes toward state responsibility* 
All Non-
religious Religious Diff. 
Social-Democratic - 
Protestant 
Denmark 10.76 4.48 4.52 4.18 -0.34 
Finland 11.20 4.47 4.47 4.50 0.04 
Iceland 11.35 4.72 4.71 4.81 0.10 
Norway 12.26 4.67 4.66 4.75 0.09 
Sweden 9.18 3.91 3.89 4.11 0.22 
Liberal - Mixed United Kingdom 33.20 4.49 4.50 4.45 -0.05 
Liberal - Catholic Ireland 73.27 4.53 4.58 4.51 -0.07 
Corporatist - Catholic 
Austria 38.53 3.89 3.97 3.76 -0.22 
Belgium 28.46 4.91 4.90 4.92 0.02 
France 13.48 4.25 4.33 3.75 -0.58 
Luxembourg 24.05 4.47 4.49 4.40 -0.09 
Corporatist - Mixed 
Germany 23.67 4.35 4.44 4.04 -0.41 
Netherlands 27.17 4.73 4.71 4.77 0.06 
Switzerland 20.21 4.05 4.06 4.02 -0.04 
Mediterranean - Catholic 
Italy 51.33 5.63 5.70 5.55 -0.15 
Malta 86.04 4.93 5.02 4.91 -0.11 
Portugal 49.18 4.74 4.81 4.69 -0.12 
Spain 35.42 5.77 5.84 5.61 -0.23 
Mediterranean - Orthodox Cyprus 55.61 4.81 4.81 4.80 -0.01 Greece 39.23 5.55 5.53 5.58 0.05 
F. Socialist - Catholic 
Croatia 45.48 5.16 5.09 5.23 0.14 
Czech Republic 12.57 4.67 4.63 4.82 0.19 
Hungary 17.95 5.84 5.84 5.83 -0.01 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations from EVS harmonized data (1990-2008). *: average score on a 1-10 
scale where 1=individual responsibility, 10=state responsibility. 
 
 
Table 3. Multilevel models of the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government 
responsibility. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coef. S.E. Sig. Coef. S.E. Sig. Coef. S.E. Sig. Coef. S.E. Sig. 
Fixed-effects parameters                         
Attending religious service at least once a 
month 
          
Religious practice -0.02 0.04 0.69 -0.12 0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.72 -0.04 0.09 0.69 
Gender (ref. Female) 
            
Male -0.26 0.02 0.00 -0.26 0.02 0.00 -0.26 0.02 0.00 -0.26 0.02 0.00 
Age band (ref. <25 y.o.) 
            
Age 25-34 y.o. 0.01 0.03 0.65 0.01 0.03 0.64 0.01 0.03 0.62 0.01 0.03 0.63 
Age 35-44 y.o. 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 
Age 45-54 y.o. 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02 
Age 55-64 y.o. -0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.03 0.03 
Age >=65 y.o. -0.17 0.04 0.00 -0.17 0.04 0.00 -0.16 0.04 0.00 -0.16 0.04 0.00 
Marital status (ref. Non-married) 
           
Married -0.11 0.02 0.00 -0.11 0.02 0.00 -0.11 0.02 0.00 -0.11 0.02 0.00 
Educational level (ref. Primary educ.) 
           
Uncompleted secondary educ. -0.17 0.03 0.00 -0.17 0.03 0.00 -0.17 0.03 0.00 -0.17 0.03 0.00 
Secondary educ. -0.40 0.03 0.00 -0.40 0.03 0.00 -0.40 0.03 0.00 -0.40 0.03 0.00 
Tertiary educ. -0.60 0.03 0.00 -0.60 0.03 0.00 -0.60 0.03 0.00 -0.60 0.03 0.00 
Occupational status (ref. Employed) 
           
Retired 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.30 0.03 0.00 
Out of labor force 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.00 
Unemployed 0.54 0.03 0.00 0.54 0.03 0.00 0.54 0.03 0.00 0.54 0.03 0.00 
Wave (ref. Second) -0.16 0.02 0.00 -0.16 0.02 0.00 -0.16 0.02 0.00 -0.16 0.02 0.00 
Forth wave 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 
Third wave 
            
             
Lithuania 27.78 5.33 4.97 5.33 0.36 
Poland 76.98 5.50 5.23 5.57 0.34 
Slovak Republic 46.76 5.61 5.49 5.75 0.26 
Slovenia 30.19 5.77 5.75 5.82 0.07 
F. Socialist - Orthodox 
Armenia 40.97 5.35 5.39 5.30 -0.09 
Belarus 17.38 5.15 5.10 5.46 0.36 
Bulgaria 15.48 5.21 5.15 5.59 0.43 
Georgia 39.52 6.66 6.67 6.62 -0.05 
Macedonia 24.98 5.78 5.68 6.14 0.46 
Moldova 30.65 4.66 4.64 4.68 0.03 
Montenegro 14.68 5.52 5.49 5.75 0.26 
Romania 43.11 4.56 4.44 4.73 0.29 
Russian Federation 11.55 5.68 5.67 5.84 0.16 
Serbia 21.35 5.30 5.33 5.20 -0.14 
Ukraine 21.67 5.97 5.94 6.08 0.14 
F. Socialist - Mixed Estonia 10.66 5.46 5.33 6.28 0.95 
Latvia 15.23 6.19 6.05 6.23 0.18 
  
Constant 5.52 0.11 0.00 5.47 0.15 0.00 5.00 0.20 0.00 5.01 0.19 0.00 
Country denomination (ref.: Catholic)                       
Mixed 
   
-0.15 0.27 0.57 
      
Protestant 
   
-0.47 0.29 0.11 
      
Eastern Orthodox 
   
0.40 0.21 0.06 
      
Interactions: religious practice *  
           
Mixed 
   
0.11 0.12 0.33 
      
Protestant 
   
0.09 0.14 0.51 
      
Orthodox 
   
0.23 0.09 0.01 
      
Welfare regime (ref.: Social-dem.) 
           
Liberal 
      
-0.09 0.37 0.80 
   
Corporatist 
      
-0.14 0.26 0.60 
   
Mediterranean 
      
0.72 0.27 0.01 
   
Former socialist 
      
0.87 0.22 0.00 
   
Interactions: religious practice *  
           
Liberal 
      
-0.07 0.15 0.64 
   
Corporatist 
      
-0.24 0.12 0.04 
   
Mediterranean 
      
-0.20 0.12 0.10 
   
Former socialist 
      
0.18 0.10 0.08 
   
Welfare regime & country denomination (ref.: Social-dem. Protestant) 
      
Liberal Catholic 
         
0.00 0.48 1.00 
Liberal Mixed 
         
-0.18 0.47 0.71 
Corporatist Catholic 
         
-0.14 0.29 0.62 
Corporatist Mixed 
         
-0.12 0.31 0.69 
Mediterranean Catholic 
         
0.71 0.29 0.01 
Mediterranean Orthodox 
         
0.73 0.36 0.05 
Former soc. Catholic 
         
0.75 0.25 0.00 
Former soc. Mixed 
         
1.23 0.36 0.00 
Former soc. Orthodox 
         
0.89 0.23 0.00 
Interactions: religious practice *  
           
Liberal Catholic 
         
-0.11 0.19 0.54 
Liberal Mixed 
         
-0.04 0.17 0.83 
Corporatist Catholic 
         
-0.24 0.12 0.04 
Corporatist Mixed 
         
-0.22 0.13 0.09 
Mediterranean Catholic 
         
-0.25 0.12 0.04 
Mediterranean Orthodox 
         
-0.06 0.16 0.71 
Former soc. Catholic 
         
0.12 0.11 0.27 
Former soc. Mixed 
         
0.47 0.17 0.00 
Former soc. Orthodox                   0.19 0.11 0.08 
Random-effects Parameters Estim. S.E.   Estim. S.E.   Estim. S.E.   Estim. S.E.   
Country: Independent 
            
sd(Religious practice) 0.24 0.04 
 
0.21 0.03 
 
0.13 0.03 
 
0.12 0.03 
 
sd(Constant) 0.63 0.07 
 
0.56 0.06 
 
0.44 0.05 
 
0.42 0.05 
 
sd(Residual) 2.66 0.01   2.66 0.01   2.66 0.01   2.66 0.01   
             
N 119490  119490  119490  119490  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Estimated effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government intervention 
according to the prevalent religious denomination. Mean and 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from EVS harmonized data 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government intervention 
according to welfare regime. Mean and 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from EVS harmonized data. 
  
 
Figure 3. Estimated effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward government intervention 
according to a combination of the prevalent religion denomination and welfare regime. Mean and 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from EVS harmonized data. 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Religious denomination by country. 
  Self-reported belonging to a religious denomination (%) 
  Catholic Protestant Orthodox Other Not belonging 
Catholic countries           
Austria 75.9 5.6 0.6 3.3 14.5 
Belgium 59.3 0.9 0.2 4.9 34.7 
Croatia 81.8 0.1 1.7 1.7 14.7 
Czech Republic 30.0 3.3 0.2 2.8 63.8 
France 50.9 1.3 0.6 3.5 43.8 
Hungary 40.3 13.4 0.1 2.4 43.8 
Ireland 87.8 2.5 0.1 2.3 7.3 
Italy 81.0 0.4 0.1 1.3 17.3 
Lithuania 71.5 0.6 3.4 2.7 21.8 
Luxembourg 62.6 1.5 0.6 5.7 29.6 
Malta 96.8 0.9 0.0 0.4 1.9 
Poland 92.8 0.2 0.4 2.3 4.3 
Portugal 81.7 0.7 0.0 2.4 15.2 
Slovak Republic 64.8 9.1 1.4 1.5 23.2 
  
Slovenia 66.9 0.3 1.2 3.4 28.2 
Spain 76.2 0.4 0.4 5.5 17.7 
Mixed countries 
     
Estonia 0.8 11.2 11.5 1.8 74.7 
Germany 27.5 31.8 0.3 2.6 37.8 
Latvia 18.4 17.2 17.3 3.5 43.5 
Netherlands 26.0 12.1 0.0 11.9 50.0 
Switzerland 32.2 30.0 1.9 9.5 26.4 
United Kingdom 18.3 37.1 0.2 15.1 29.4 
Protestant countries 
     
Denmark 0.7 86.9 0.0 2.1 10.4 
Finland 0.1 61.3 1.0 21.2 16.3 
Iceland 1.1 88.2 0.0 5.8 4.9 
Norway 1.5 78.6 0.3 4.6 15.0 
Sweden 1.3 67.5 0.5 5.7 25.1 
Orthodox countries 
     
Armenia 0.0 0.1 90.5 4.0 5.3 
Belarus 7.9 0.6 54.4 0.9 36.2 
Bulgaria 0.2 0.4 49.7 11.8 37.9 
Cyprus 1.5 0.1 96.8 1.2 0.4 
Georgia 0.3 0.0 90.8 7.4 1.5 
Greece 1.0 0.0 93.8 1.6 3.5 
Macedonia 0.4 0.1 73.8 18.9 6.9 
Moldova 0.4 0.3 89.6 3.3 6.4 
Montenegro 3.1 0.1 39.2 17.2 40.5 
Romania 5.0 1.9 86.1 3.8 3.3 
Russia 0.3 0.3 51.3 4.9 43.3 
Serbia 5.3 1.2 59.8 3.8 30.0 
Ukraine 5.4 2.1 46.3 15.1 31.0 
 
 
